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9 November 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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C O N T E N T S

1. USSR-Berlin: Soviet leaders trying to document claims of agreements on autobahn procedures. (Page 1)
2. Communist China: Peiping to admit non-Communist technicians and permit Chinese trainees to study in non-Communist nations. (Page 2)



25X1

7. Common Market: Year-end crisis looms. (Page 7)
8. Notes: USSR; [redacted]
Italy. (Page 8)

25X1

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

9 November 1963

DAILY BRIEF

USSR-Berlin: Soviet leaders continue their efforts to document their claim that US military convoys have violated an alleged US-Soviet agreement on "established practices" respecting autobahn traffic.

(On 7 November, in a conversation with Ambassador Kohler, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko referred to "an agreement concluded between the Allied military powers in 1945, specifying that military authorities should establish access procedure to be followed." He also referred to a specific communication sent in 1958 by General Zakharov to the US commanding general in West Germany. Gromyko maintained that "these were the basis of established practices respecting autobahn traffic.")

(Gromyko implied to Kohler that the Soviet Government was preparing a formal communication on the whole question of access. Such a statement might include a call for four-power talks on the immediate issues related to Allied access to West Berlin.)

25X1

Communist China: (The Chinese Communists for the first time have agreed to admit a substantial number of non-Communist technicians to China and permit Chinese trainees to study in non-Communist countries.)

(Several hundred" Japanese technicians are to install a vinylon plant in Changchun, Manchuria, starting in late 1964. British and Dutch technicians are to assist with construction of a large chemical fertilizer complex at Luchou, Szechwan.)

(The Chinese are planning to send 60 to 80 trainees to the Kurashiki Rayon Company, suppliers of the vinylon plant, in mid-1964. Others are to be sent to the Netherlands for training.)

(The Chinese have long been fearful that foreigners are potential spies and that trainees sent abroad might defect.)

(The present willingness to subordinate security considerations is indicative of the importance to China of recent contracts for industrial plants, the first to be signed in non-Communist countries after nearly three years of window shopping.)

25X1

25X1

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Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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Common Market: (The Common Market appears headed into a year-end crisis over the agricultural integration problem and the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations.)

(Despite recent statements from De Gaulle that he has set no deadline for EEC agreement on the farm question, the French have proposed that the EEC Council sit in virtually continuous session during December. [redacted] the objective would be to reach an agreement both on an agricultural package deal and on practically every aspect of the upcoming tariff negotiations.)

25X1

(Prospects for such an agreement are poor. West German acceptance of the 5 November proposal of EEC Commissioner Mansholt for achieving grain-price harmonization--the key agricultural question--seems improbable. Moreover, it is likely that differences over the Mansholt plan will probably delay the agreement on regulations governing rice, dairy products, and beef beyond the present 31 December deadline. Until these questions are settled Paris is unlikely to give the go-ahead which would permit the EEC to participate effectively in the Kennedy Round.)

(Paris, although apparently aware of the difficulty of resolving the farm issue in the next two months, may be hoping to repeat its success of January 1962 when prolonged negotiations under pressure of a deadline resulted in the initial EEC agreement on a common agricultural policy. This approach created an atmosphere of crisis and tension, however, and the resulting agreement was on some points vague enough to be open to subsequent differences of interpretation.)

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NOTES

*USSR: Soviet party secretary Suslov was absent from the anniversary celebration in Moscow on 6 and 7 November and his photograph in a sizable number of propaganda displays was relegated to a much lower position than in previous years. A sharp shift downwards in this type of protocol treatment usually reflects political difficulties. If Suslov is in decline, some clarification of his status and possibly its political implications might be expected at the next session of the party central committee, which will probably convene within a month.

25X1

25X1

9 Nov 63

DAILY BRIEF

8

25X1

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Italy: Italian Socialist leaders told the US Embassy on 6 November that an "authoritative Christian Democrat (CD) official" had informed them that the US is "pressuring" for a definite commitment on the MLF during current cabinet negotiations. These leaders added that, although not opposed to the MLF in principle, they could not enter the government if the CD insisted on such a commitment at this time. The Socialists reiterated that while they could not vote during the next several months for a treaty creating the MLF, they would be willing to go along with Italian participation in the current MLF studies in Paris and Washington.

25X1

25X1

9 Nov 63

DAILY BRIEF

9

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The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

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Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

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1. The purpose of this document is to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of the world's nuclear energy resources and the potential for their use in the future. This document is intended for the use of the Department of Energy and the Atomic Energy Commission.

2. The world's nuclear energy resources are estimated to be sufficient to meet the world's energy needs for the next 100 years. The potential for nuclear energy is vast, and it is essential that we develop the technology to harness it safely and efficiently.

3. The development of nuclear energy is a complex task that requires the cooperation of many different groups and individuals. It is essential that we have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, and that we have the necessary resources to develop it safely and efficiently.

4. The development of nuclear energy is a long-term project that requires a commitment of time and resources. It is essential that we have a clear understanding of the risks and benefits of nuclear energy, and that we have the necessary resources to develop it safely and efficiently.

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